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ARGUMENT
I.
Appellee's Brief Is Deficient Violates Rule 24(e) and Does Not Support A
Ruling To Affirm The Summary Judgment Dismissal.
The Brief for Appellees/Defendants is deficient in several aspects. The Statement of
Facts submitted by Appellees/Defendants does not include references to the record. See
Appellees' Brief at 2-6. It does not comply with Rule 24(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Therefore, this Court has no support or documentation regarding any of
Defendants' purported facts.
Bluemel disagrees with many of Defendants' facts. However, he will not attempt to
address those differences because Defendants have failed to follow the required rules on
appeal. All of Bluemel's facts are supported by the record on appeal. See Statement of Facts
in Bluemel's original brief at 4 to 13. Inasmuch as Defendants' facts are in stark contrast to
Bluemel's facts, they only serve to highlight the genuine issues of material fact which
preclude summary judgment in this case.
Since this case is extremely fact sensitive, and Bluemel has raised a multitude of
factual disputes in his original brief, Defendants' deficiency is crucial to resolution of this
appeal. Pursuant to Rule 24(k), this Court has the option to disregard or strike the brief for
Defendants, or to assess attorney fees against them. Each of the facts submitted in Bluemel's
original brief are properly cited pursuant to Rule 24(e). Since it is impossible to assess the
merits of Defendants' brief without the crucial citations to the record, a significant sanction
is warranted. Because Defendants' violation of Rule 24(e) is so blatant and their factual
statement contains no citations to the record, their brief should be stricken.
A, Defendants9 Brief Is Not Supported by any Legal Authority.
Defendants' brief also is deficient or suspect because it is not supported by any legal
authority, statute, rules or case law.
1

Defendants' brief is rampant with conclusory allegations and statements which are not
supported by any legal authority. For example, Defendants argue the lower court's decision
to grant summary judgment disposed of all causes of action. See Defendants' brief at 8.
Defendants' summary judgment pleadings and their oral argument never addressed
Bluemel's non-contract causes of action.
"Since all of the Appellant's alleged theories of liability rely upon the duties
established by contract they were dismissed." Id. Defendants have not submitted any
authority for their argument.
This is the first time Defendants have made such an argument or statement. They did
not address it before the lower court. Defendants have cited no legal authority for such a
position. As argued in Bluemel's original brief, even though the case may have started out
as a contract matter, he has different causes of action for misrepresentation or negligence which were never addressed in the lower court's ruling.
Although Bluemel clearly has alleged contract claims against Defendants, the Second
Amended Complaint also included causes of action for malpractice, reckless misconduct,
promissory estoppel and reasonable reliance. See Bluemel's original brief at 16-17. These
claims do not rise and fall on the contract issue. Once Defendants met with Bluemel and
began corresponding, they had a duty to assist him. Defendants' promises and
correspondence solidified that duty. See Inmate intake forms, Index at 588-90; Defendants'
"Memorandum" at 613. When Bluemel met with Defendant David J. Angerhofer on January
24, 2000, they discussed Bluemel's concerns or questions about the charge to which he had
pled guilty and the potential sentence. One of the reasons Defendant requested Bluemel to
submit a copy of the plea form was because of Bluemel's questions. See Index at 590, where
Defendant's notes reflect his request for Bluemel to produce the plea form. Bluemel's
2

statement of defendant in advance of plea includes some scratched out language under the
"punishment" section, which language Bluemel believed originally stated 0-5 years and was
changed to 5 years to life. Index at 796.
Bluemel provided Defendants with all information they requested. Defendants'
"Memorandum" promise was clear and unambiguous. Index at 613. Once Defendants
received BluemePs documents, they would prepare the pleadings unless they determined the
case was "questionable as to merit" - and then they would contact Bluemel "for further
instructions." Defendants never informed him they had any concerns about his claims or that
they lacked merit. Defendants never contacted Bluemel for further instructions.
Defendants never informed Bluemel they were no longer assisting him. They never
sent him to seek other counsel. To the contrary, all of Defendants' interactions with Bluemel
led him to believe they were actively assisting him, i.e., providing legal services on his
behalf.
At the very least, the record shows genuine issues of material fact whether Bluemel
has an independent negligence or malpractice claim against Defendants. Under Model Utah
Jury Instruction No. 7.42, Bluemel must prove an "attorney-client relationship" existed
between himself and Defendants, and that they owed a duty to him. See attached Appendix,
copy of pertinent Model Utah Jury Instructions. Pursuant to Instruction No. 7.43, "[a]n
implied relationship exists when the plaintiff seeks and receives the advice of the attorney
in matters pertinent to the attorney's profession." Defendants induced Bluemel's belief that
an attorney-client relationship existed based upon their representations and conduct. There
is no requirement that this relationship be based upon an express contract. See MUJI No.
7.43.
Therefore, Defendants' position that the contract issue resolves all of Bluemel's
3

causes of action is incorrect.
B. The Lower Court Did Not Resolve the Motion to Compel Discovery,
Some of Defendants' arguments not only are unsupported by the record, but are totally
illogical. Defendants make assumptions which are not consistent with the record or the lower
court's ruling.
Defendants correctly argue that both the Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion
to Compel Discovery were argued before the Court at the June 12, 2007, Motions Hearing.
Although neither the Court's Minute Entry nor the Order related to that hearing addressed
the Court's decision regarding the Motion to Compel, Defendants still argue the lower court
somehow ruled on this issue. See Index at 745, 906-07. The only support Defendants raise
for this novel position is the Minute Entry of June 20, 2007, which states "after being fully
advised," the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. See Defendants' brief at 12.
Defendants then conclude: "Clearly the Court's Order addressed both the Summary Judgment
and Motion to Compel." Id. Defendants' conclusion is not only illogical and unsupported,
but unsupportable.
The lower court's ruling did not address the discovery dispute. As articulated in
Section VI of Bluemel's original brief at 28-32, the lower court's failure to resolve the
Motion to Compel Discovery is grounds for reversal.
C. Genuine Issues Exist Whether Bluemel Suffered Damages.
Defendants' argument that Bluemel could not have been damaged because the
underlying petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed on its merits by the Honorable
Anthony Quinn, is without merit. See Defendants' brief at 12-13. Defendants argue simply
that because the petition was fairly analyzed by the court and dismissed, Bluemel cannot
prove any damages. "Said decision thoroughly analyzed Appellant's factual allegations that
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were set forth in his petition. Judge Quinn ruled that the petition lacked merit after
considering the facts that were set forth by the Appellant. No portion of Judge Quinn's
opinion was founded upon any procedural defect." Id. (emphasis in original).
In reality, part of Defendants' argument actually supports Bluemel's position. The
court analyzed the original petition but denied it based upon the "factual allegations that were
set forth in his petition." Defendants submitted Bluemel's handwritten petition to the court
without any editing whatsoever. In addition, Defendants failed to submit substantial
documentation which would have provided the factual basis for relief. See Bluemel's brief
at 32-36. One of the key issues in the entire case is the Defendants' misplacing or losing
crucial medical documentation which Bluemel and his family had submitted to Defendants
for inclusion with the petition, but which was never submitted to the Third District Court.
Bluemel maintains that not only has he been damaged, but his damages are
astronomical. It now appears he is forever barred from raising any attack on his conviction
because of the fatal flaws which originated with the rough draft petition filed by Defendants,
which Bluemel has never been able to cure throughout subsequent filings.
P. Defendants Failed to Research, Draft or Edit a Viable Petition.
Defendants argue Bluemel has never explained how his case would have been
benefitted if Defendants had reviewed the original Petition and redrafted it. See Defendants'
Brief at 12-13.
Bluemel had a legally cognizable claim which could and should have been presented
in the original Petition.. He believes that if Defendants had taken the raw material and
information provided by Bluemel, researched it and then drafted a legitimate pleading —
pursuant to their "Memorandum" promise — it would not have been subjected to such a
summary dismissal by Judge Anthony Quinn. Bluemel simply filled in the blanks on a blank
5

petition submitted to him by Defendants. Thus, what was filed with the court was a fill-inthe-blank petition drafted and crafted by an unschooled, unprofessional inmate who had no
clue what he was doing. Defendants should have reviewed the medical and mental health
history, the medications Bluemel was taking at the time of the plea, and fashioned a solid
petition which would have had merit. Instead, Defendants apparently did not even "review"
the Petition before filing it. See Defendants' Brief at 13. Defendants did not support the
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with any memorandum of points and authorities.
Defendants did not articulate the nature of BluemePs organic brain injury, and how it
impacted the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea colloquy. Defendants did not include
anything in the Petition about the potential problems with the plea form. See Index at 796,
section IA, supra, at 2-3.
The issue of damages is another area which involves various issues of material fact
which should preclude summary judgment.
Despite the argument made by Defendants, nothing in the first Utah Court of Appeals
decision, 2004 UT App. 387, denies Bluemel the relief sought in this appeal. Defendants'
brief at 11. The earlier decision addressed the fact Bluemel had filed under the wrong
contract, and addressed the third-party beneficiaries status. See Index at 735-36. It did not
address most of the issues pending in this appeal.
E. Defendants Failed to Respond to the Properly Filed First Amended Complaint
Defendants' argument they never answered Bluemel's First Amended Complaint
because it was never filed with the court is contrary to the record. See Defendants' brief at
9-10.
Defendants argue the "proposed First Amended Complaint" was dated April 14,2004,
and it was never filed with the court because the Order granting leave to file the Amended
6

Complaint was not signed until April 28, 2004. That was the same date Defendants filed
their opposition to the Motion for Leave to File the Amended Complaint. See Index at 299;
Defendants' Brief at 9.
It is noteworthy, however, that Bluemel's First Amended Complaint includes two date
stamps from the court: one for April 14, 2004, and the other April 28, 2004. Index at 272.
The date stamp of April 14, 2008 has been crossed out. The date stamp of April 28th is
signed by a court clerk. Id at 272. Therefore, the new Complaint was deemed filed April 28,
2004. Despite Defendants' argument, the more logical explanation is the court signed the
Order on April 28, 2004, and then had its clerk re-stamp the First Amended Complaint on
the same date to indicate it was filed on April 28.
The Order granting leave to file the Amended Complaint did not require Bluemel to
re-file the First Amended Complaint, which already had been submitted to the court. See
Index at 270. There is no statute or rule which require a refiling by Bluemel. Rule 15(a) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: [a] party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days
after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court
otherwise orders."
Since the court did not order otherwise, Defendants' response should have been filed
within ten days of the April 28th Order authorizing the filing of the Amended Complaint.
Based upon Defendants' failure to respond to the new Complaint, all allegations
should have been deemed admitted. As argued in Bluemel's original brief at 20-21, this issue
also justified reversal.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth in BluemePs original brief,
this Court should reverse the lower court's summary judgment ruling and remand the matter
for a trial on the merits.
DATED this 30th day of June, 2008.
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David
W.for
Brown
<Attorney
Bluemel/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANT were mailed, postage prepaid, this 1st day of July, 2008, to the following:
David J. Angerhofer
Wayne A. Freestone
Crescent Square, #11
11075 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
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ADDENDUM

MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS

MODEL
UTAH
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
CIVIL
1993 Edition

UTAH STATE BAR

THE MICHIE COMPANY
Law Publishers
CHARLOTTESVILLE,

VIRGINIA

OTHER PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE

7.42

MUJI 7.42
ELEMENTS OF CLAIM FOR
ATTORNEY'S NEGLIGENCE
In this case, the plaintiff must prove each of the following
elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. The existence of an attorney-client relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant;
2. The existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff;
3. That the defendant was negligent in breaching that duty;
4. That the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of
actual injury, loss or damage to the plaintiff.
References:
Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887 (Utah 1988)
Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
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7.43

MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL

MUJI 7.43
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
The existence of an attorney-client relationship can be
established by an express contract or by an implied contract based
upon the conduct of the parties. An implied relationship exists
when the plaintiff seeks and receives the advice of the attorney in
matters pertinent to the attorney's profession. However, the
plaintiff's belief that an attorney-client relationship exists, unless
reasonably induced by representations or conduct of the attorney,
is not sufficient to create an attorney-client relationship.
References*.
Margulies ex rel. Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985)
Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Ut Ct. App. 1990)
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